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Civil Liberties and the Mentally Ill
Thomas S. Szasz*
"The history of liberty has largely been the history of
observance of procedural safeguards."
Justice Felix Frankfurter1
T HERE ARE TWO BASIC WAYS in which a person may assume the
social role of "mental patient." First, it may be assumed
voluntarily, meaning that the role is self-defined. Second, it may
be foisted upon a person against his will. This means that a per-
son may be defined as "mentally ill" by someone other than him-
self. This definition, then, if properly implemented, may become
generally accepted or socially verified. Since I have commented
on some aspects of this problem elsewhere, 2 I shall limit myself
here to calling attention to certain ethical and legal aspects of
the psychiatrist's involvement with the second class of "mentally
ill" patients.
Differences Between the Voluntary and the Involuntary Patient
Our present-day conception of the physician-patient rela-
tionship presupposes a patient who considers himself sick and
who therefore voluntarily seeks the physician's help.3 The at-
torney-client relationship is also of this kind. The relationship of
a person who consults a psychiatrist or non-medical psychothera-
pist is similar to the two preceding contracts in that a "sufferer"
considers himself to be in "trouble" for which he seeks "help"
from an "expert." All this is self-evident and would require no
explicit formulation were it not for the fact that much of general
psychiatric practice violates these principles.
What is the relationship between the involuntary psychiatric
patient and the psychiatrist? It would seem that since the patient
* M.D.; Professor of Psychiatry, Upstate Medical Center, State University of
New York, Syracuse, New York; Diplomate, American Board of Psychiatry
and Neurology; Author of "Pain and Pleasure" and numerous articles on
general and forensic psychiatry.
1 Frankfurter, F. Quoted in Pfeffer, L., The Liberties of An American: The
Supreme Court Speaks, p. 154. The Beacon Press, Boston, 1956.
2 Szasz, T. S., The Problem of Psychiatric Nosology: A Contribution to a
Situational Analysis of Psychiatric Operations. 114 American Journal of
Psychiatry, 405 (November 1957).
3 Parsons, T., Social Structure and Dynamic Process: The Case of Modern
Medical Practice. In, Parsons, T., The Social System, Chapter X, pp. 428-
479. The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952.
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occupies the sick role involuntarily, the person or persons who
assigned him this role must appear, at least from his point of
view, as his adversaries. We do not have far to look for a ser-
viceable analogy of this relationship. A person accused of a
wrong-doing or crime occupies a similar position with respect to
those who accuse and prosecute him. For example, in a criminal
litigation, the defendant and the grand jury occupy a relationship
to each other similar to that of a so-called psychotic patient and
the psychiatrist who recommends his commitment. (More will
be said about this presently.) Yet, psychiatrists who function
in this way usually consider themselves to be acting for, not
against, the patient. If they do so, it is because they claim to
have "therapeutic" motives or goals. In this discussion, however,
we ought not lapse into the modern psychiatric error of always
focusing on motives, and should strive to keep our eyes fixed on
social phenomena.4
Illustrative Examples
In order to sharply etch the issues on which I wish to focus,
let us consider two paradigmatic situations.
First, the case of the voluntary psychiatric patient. A typical
instance might be a man unhappy and troubled about his mar-
riage. Given the proper educational and social circumstances,
such a person might decide to seek the help of a psychotherapist.
In so doing, he would be willing to undergo the humiliation
(should he feel that way about it) and the expenditure of time,
effort, and money involved in securing this type of help, on the
assumption that the expert whom he has hired might be of some
assistance to him. This man has thus defined himself as "men-
tally ill," but he is free to begin, continue, or terminate "treat-
4 I think it is essential that we not get bogged down in this discussion with
considerations of the psychiatrists' motives. Thus, on the one hand, we
shall expressly disallow claims of "therapeutic" intent as explanations of
commitment; and on the other hand, we wish to defend ourselves in ad-
vance against the claim that we are accusing psychiatrists of acting with
malicious intent, as if they were siding with the relatives against the pa-
tient. It seems likely that, as a rule, psychiatrists recommending commit-
ment do so because they think this advice is reasonable and "right"-in
other words, because they believe that this is what is "expected" of them.
Whenever this is the case, they act, of course, out of neither good nor bad
intentions, but rather fulfill a standardized kind of social expectation. In
other areas of work, where the objects of one's actions are inanimate
rather than human, this would be called "doing a good, workman-like job."
In this connection, see Szasz, T. S., Commitment of the Mentally Ill: 'Treat-
ment' or Social Restraint? 125 Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 293
(April-June, 1957).
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ment" as he sees fit. The social contract between patient and
therapist is similar to that which prevails in cases of, say, pneu-
monia or peptic ulcer.
The situation concerning the involuntary psychiatric patient
is totally different. A typical example might be a case of so-
called postpartum depression. Shortly after the birth of a baby,
the mother begins to feel and act despondent and fails to dis-
charge her usual housewifely duties. The husband, faced with
the dilemma of a disintegrating household and an increasingly
incoherent wife, may then call in a physician (who may or may
not be a psychiatrist) to remedy the situation. Officially, the
help-seeking situation is defined as serving the needs of the wife.
But, in fact, it is the husband who calls for help, and since he
too is obviously distressed by his wife's "illness," a good case
could be made out for arguing that he himself hopes to benefit
from the physician's intervention. When the physician arrives,
he represents himself as wanting to help the patient (wife). After
examining her, he recommends that she be hospitalized. If she
refuses to comply with this recommendation, the chances are
that he will sign commitment papers. This is a momentous step,
for it means that a chain-reaction is being set in motion, the
final effect of which usually is involuntary hospitalization and
at least temporary loss of civil liberties for the patient.
This chain-reaction will run its usual course, ending with
the commitment of the patient, unless she (a) knows how to
protect herself from the forces that have been set in motion,
and (b) has the necessary vitality, at this point, to avail herself
of her potential resources. Commonly, patients lack one or both
of these requisites for effective self-protection. Hence, they are
not well able to discriminate in regard to the merits of offers
promising protection.
A Bill of Rights for the Mentally Ill
It is clear that the social role of the involuntary mental
patient can come into being only when someone is accused of
suffering from a "mental illness." To be accused of "mental
illness" is analogous to being accused of a wrong-doing or crime,
such as, say, theft, assault, or murder. If the legitimacy of this
interpretation is granted-and usually it is not, for it is persistent-
ly argued that the patient is not being accused of anything but
is merely being "protected" and "treated"-a number of in-
ferences logically follow. First, it is essential that the accused be
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
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clearly informed of the nature of the charges against him; sec-
ond, of who his accuser is; third, that whatever he will reveal
about himself might be held against him; and fourth, he must
have certain clearly defined methods for rebutting his accusers
(for example, he must have counsel to defend him). It is evi-
dent that a person accused of "mental illness" and threatened
with the possibility of incarceration in a mental hospital-and its
attendant calamitous consequences for his employment and other
opportunities--does not possess these elementary legal safe-
guards. In these respects, therefore, he lacks the guarantees of
personal freedom which all democratic societies have considered
essential for insuring the dignity of man.5
What, then, would a Bill of Rights for the "mentally ill"
involve? Without entering into all of the ramifications of this
problem, I would submit-as a first approximation to our goal, as
it were-that the individual threatened with involuntary psychia-
tric hospitalization should be accorded the same sort of protec-
tion as would be his if he were accused of a wrong-doing (in a
civil litigation) or of a crime. This would entail, briefly, the
following provisions:
1. The physician (psychiatrist) summoned to examine the
patient by a so-called responsible relative, or by someone else,
should be officially designated as the caller's agent. His role
would be analogous to that of a grand jury whose job it is to de-
cide, not whether a person is guilty of a given act, but rather,
whether to put him in the predicament of having to defend him-
self against certain formally preferred charges. Physicians con-
fronted by "mentally ill" patients frequently act as one-man grand
juries. If their decision is to recommend commitment, the person
is shifted from the role of citizen to that of "potentially com-
mitable patient" (this corresponds to the role-change from citi-
zen to accused in the criminal analogy). If the patient is to de-
fend himself against the consequences of such an "indictment,"
he must know that he has been charged with certain "mentally
disordered acts." Hence the patient would have to be informed
as to the examining psychiatrist's role and the "charges" against
him.6
5 Pfeffer, L., The Liberties of An American; The Supreme Court Speaks,
The Beacon Press, 1956.-Popper, K. R., The Open Society and Its Enemies.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1950.
6 Szasz, T. S., Recent Books on the Relation of Psychiatry to Criminology
(A Review Article). 21 Psychiatry 307 (August, 1958).
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2. The patient accused of "mental illness" should have the
right to enlist the aid of an expert on his behalf. Clearly under-
stood, this would, of course, be more than just a right; it would
be an expectation. For instance, a man accused of income-tax
evasion would naturally rush to his attorney, for he would know
that he can reasonably expect help from him. If he were in con-
flict with the Internal Revenue Service, he would not expect that
this agency's legal department could be entrusted with the task
of furthering his interests. Responsive to the significance of this
provision, society has provided that indigent persons can avail
themselves of court-appointed defense counsel, or of other free
legal aid, to assist them in their defense. No such opportunities
are provided for the "mentally ill." In fact, they are now placed
in the impossible situation of having to expect help from those
who had first "accused" (i.e., diagnosed) and then "punished"
(i.e., involuntarily hospitalized) them.7
3. The conflict of interests having been clearly exposed, the
judge entrusted with settling the dispute should be as impartial
as possible. This is best achieved by making certain that he does
not personally benefit from deciding in favor of either party. In
a civil suit, for example, he must not have any economic (or
other) interest in the affairs of the litigants.
(a) At present the judge's position in the commitment pro-
cedure is anomalous, because the problem is a priori so defined
that even when he decides in favor of the plaintiff, he is "help-
ing" the defendant! In other words, in approving the physician's
certificate recommending commitment, he clearly rules in favor
of the plaintiff. Yet, by sentencing the patient to a "hospital,"
for "treatment," the whole thing is made to appear as if it were
not at all a contest of opposing interests.8
(b) What would the judge's task be if the procedure were
changed so that "mental patients" would have the same rights
as criminals (and everyone else) in our society? Faced with a
more sharply etched conflict of interests-as for example between
depressed, ineffective wife and neglected husband, or between
alcoholic-abusive husband and all-suffering wife-and not with
7 Szasz, T. S., Malingering: "Diagnosis" or Social Condemnation? 76
A. M. A. Archives of Neurology & Psychiatry 432 (October 1956).
8 Szasz, T. S., Commitment of the Mentally Ill: "Treatment" or Social Re-
straint? 125 Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease 293 (April-June 1957);
Politics and Mental Health: Some Remarks Apropos of the Case of Mr.
Ezra Pound. 115 American Journal of Psychiatry 508 (December 1958).
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the pseudo-problem of "mental illness," 0 -the judge could not
take refuge in the easy way out, namely commitment, believing
that he is doing the "right thing." Being more truly impartial
toward the needs and actions of both parties, he might more
readily dispose of these problems by assigning lesser penalties
than those entailed in commitment and involuntary hospitaliza-
tion. In general, he might be more disposed to resolve conflicts
of interests between "responsible relatives" and "irresponsible
patients" by pointing out that if A does not like what B is doing,
he can either ask B to leave and cease annoying him, or should
that fail, he can leave. This shows us immediately what sort of
new problems would arise if there were a Bill of Rights for the
''mentally ill." To consider this further would carry us too far
afield, and we must remain content with reiterating the all too
familiar observation that it is far easier, at least for those in
power, to run a society by oppressing certain groups or segments
of the population than it is by granting equal rights to all.'0
Commitment as an Extra-Legal System of Social Control
I do not see how it is possible to deny that persons who fall
into the second class of "mentally ill patients"-that is, the in-
voluntarily hospitalized or committed patients-are deprived of
their civil liberties. How can this occur and how is it accom-
plished?
The main reason for its occurrence is simple: Those judged
to require hospitalization for "mental illness," but who refuse to
acknowledge their need for it, are regarded and treated as if they
were children. This is why we hear of such things as "responsible
relatives," "guardians," and other similar social statuses. In no
society, no matter how democratic or egalitarian, do children
have the same civil rights and liberties as adults. It is manifestly
absurd to expect that such an arrangement could work. Children
thus constitute a ready-made reservoir of humanoids: they have
all the attributes and potentialities of persons, but are not quite
persons themselves. Moreover, since there are certain significant
' Szasz, T. S., The Myth of Mental Illness. 15 American Psychologist 113
(February 1960).
10 In an excellent discussion of the privilege against self-incrimination and
its relation to confidential communication privileges, Louisell quoted the
following utterance which, I assume, is something of a classic among legal
scholars: "It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade (in India)
rubbing red pepper in a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunt-
ing evidence." (Louisell, D. W., The Psychologist in Today's Legal World:
Part II. 41 Minnesota Law Review 731 (1957), at 749).
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empirical connections between childishness (or psycho-social im-
maturity) on the one hand, and what is often called "mental
illness" on the other, the temptation is great legally to demote,
as it were, adult mental patients to the judicial rank of children.
The ways and means whereby the disenfranchisement of the
mentally ill is brought about are numerous and complex. I shall
omit discussing specific social and legal procedures and shall
focus instead on certain basic principles. The crux of the matter,
perhaps, is this: Physicians (especially psychiatrists), the police,
judges, and mental hospitals and their staffs constitute a set of
social agencies (structures), possessing social power. Although
these persons and institutions are, so to speak, properly legalized,
nonetheless they operate in what is, in a larger sense, an extra-
legal atmosphere. What is meant by this is that although the
activities of each of these persons, as presently exercised, are
legally sanctioned, and hence-as common sense would have it-
entirely proper, the totality of the arrangement is, I submit,
against the letter and spirit of the constitution. Instead of trying
to document this assertion, which would require a separate essay
in itself, let me merely cite some pertinent examples which will
highlight the major issues involved in the ethics and legality
of commitment.
Consider a man or a woman who is a Christian Scientist and
who is suffering from an illness. Can the law compel him to
seek medical treatment against his will? No. Or, take the case
of a man who belongs to the religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses and who needs an operation requiring the use of blood-
transfusions. The latter procedure is specifically prohibited by
the beliefs of these people. The law permits them to forego the
benefits of this medical procedure. Significantly, should the
child of such parents require a blood transfusion, legal steps can
be taken to remove the child from the parents' custody and
make him a ward of the state. Permission for the procedure can
then be obtained in spite of the parents' wishes. Here we have a
close analogy to commitment: as the jurisdiction concerning the
child's welfare is taken from the parents, so the mental patient's
jurisdiction over his own body and personality may be wrested
from him and placed in the hands of others (relatives, the state,
etc.). Finally, consider the way conscientious objectors were
treated during the last war. Their human dignity was respected
and they were allowed an alternative to regular soldiering.
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
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Faced with induction into the armed forces, they had the option
of electing to serve in a non-combatant capacity.
Faced with the possibility of psychiatric hospitalization, what
options do mental patients have? If the patient is wealthy and
not too disabled, he may be fortunate enough to have a number
of choices. He is, thus, relatively well-protected. But is it not
precisely the most downtrodden, the most "disabled"-whether
because of poverty, lack of education, color or creed, or what
not-who need the legal safeguards of a democratic society the
most? Hence, we should consider the options that the poorest and
most "psychotic" persons have when faced with the dilemma of
involuntary mental hospitalization.1 They have, in fact, no
option but one, namely, "voluntary commitment." This is like
pleading guilty when accused of a crime. The offender confesses
all and throws himself on the mercy of his accusers and judges.
The status of "voluntary commitment," which still exists in many
states, would really have to be considered a farce, were it not
for its tragic implications. Why should someone be committed
voluntarily? If the patient is in the hospital really of his free
will (this does not imply that certain kinds or degrees of pressure
might not have been used to get him there), why should he be
put in the jeopardy inherent in a committed status? Thus, volun-
tary commitment is not at all the humanistic compromise be-
tween fully voluntary hospitalization on the one hand and im-
prisonment on the other, which it is often claimed to be, but,
on the contrary, is merely another sign of the fact that the com-
mitted patient is legally much like a slave. He may be a "volun-
tary" slave as against an "involuntary" one, but what is the dif-
ference? In either case, while he is in the hospital he has few
of the basic human rights which he would have outside of it.
I have tried to show, by means of these examples, that a
considerable part of contemporary psychiatric practice-namely,
that dealing with involuntary patients-deals with a set of extra-
legal offenses, rules, and penalties.12 In other words, there are
11 It is pertinent to point out in this connection that the values of equality
and justice do not play the same role in medicine as they do in law, ethics
or philosophy. In their thoughtful study of the similarities and differences
between the sick and the criminal (roles), Aubert and Messinger clearly
stated that: "Equality before medicine is not an ideal of the same kind as
equality before the law. It is the duty of the health authorities, not of
medical science nor of the doctor, to think of justice." (Aubert, V. and
Messinger, S. L., The Criminal and the Sick. 1 Inquiry 137 (1958), at 155.)
12 Parsons, T., Definitions of Health and Illness in the Light of American
Values and Social Structure. In, Jaco, E. G. (Editor), Patients, Physicians,
and Illness, Chapter 20, pp. 165-187. The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958.
Sept., 1960
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two basic ways in which a person may be penalized in our pres-
ent society. One is by running afoul of the law. The other by
running afoul of psychiatrists. Let me specify. The first set of
rules and penalties, made up of the laws of a country or state,
are familiar to everyone. They are set out in advance and
usually people try to keep within them. Nothing more need be
said about laws as a system of social controls, except that they
should serve as the standard against which the second set of
rules may be measured. 13 These consist, on the whole, of social
customs or mores. By their very nature, they are not as clearly
set forth nor as well specified as laws. If they are violated, the
usual penalties are, as they should be, extra-legal: That is, social
ostracism, loss of employment or friends, personal enmities, and
so forth. At some point in these extra-legal penalties, however,
there is a bridge with the legal system of law-enforcement. This
bridge is the medical profession. Physicians are licensed by the
state and thus owe a measure of responsibility to it. When
physicians are involved in adjudicating certain interpersonal and
social conflicts, they can, and often do, implement the powers
inherent in their expert status with the power of the police. 14
Summing up, it is important to note that the two systems of
social controls overlap to some extent. Offenders officially de-
fined as criminals may plead insanity. Psychiatrists then join
jurists in interpreting rules and affixing penalties. All this, how-
ever, takes place in the framework of traditional legal safe-
guards. A man accused of a crime is innocent until proven guilty.
The psychiatrist is bound by this ground-rule as much as every-
one else associated with the trial.
In the alternate system, that is, where a person is accused of
"mental illness" and the psychiatrist wishes to involve the legal
system by recommending commitment, the ground-rules are dif-
ferent. Once the psychiatrist has made a "diagnosis," the patient
is considered "sick." The psychiatrist does not have to prove his
allegation (in court or outside of it). But the patient must now
prove, as it were, that he is "not sick." And how can he do this,
especially when he is ignorant of the criteria used to establish
13 Hayek, F. A., The Road to Serfdom. Phoenix Books (The University of
Chicago Press), Chicago, 1957.-Popper, K. R., op. cit.
14 Guttmacher, S. and Weihofen, H., Psychiatry and the Law. W. W. Norton
& Co., New York, 1952.-Szasz, T. S., The Concept of Testamentary Ca-
pacity: Further Observations on the Role of Psychiatric Concepts in Legal
Situations. 125 Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease 474 (July-September
1957).
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that he was "sick" in the first place? Thus, in sum, the patient
has no counter-diagnostician (comparable to the defense at-
torney), the judge is not impartial, and the patient finds himself
in legal jeopardy without having broken a law or being accused
of a crime, and without having been tried and convicted.
Due Process of Law Versus Psychiatric Treatment
My thesis may require clarification on two specific points,
both pertaining to the precise means for safe-guarding the in-
voluntary mental patient's civil liberties. I shall try to deal with
these issues in the hope of anticipating and answering certain
objections that might be raised against my views.
The first problem concerns the matter of informing the pa-
tient that the psychiatrist who had been summoned by, say, the
relatives (or the employer, etc.) is not his agent, but is an agent
of the caller. The question may be asked: How do you explain
such a thing to a so-called "catatonic patient" or to a "homicidal
paranoid"? Implicit in this is the assumption that the patient's
condition is not unlike that of a man struck by a car bleeding to
death. You do not try to explain about a transfusion to such a
man; rather, you take steps to treat him.
There can be no doubt that if we regard "psychiatric emer-
gencies" (of the type mentioned above) as essentially similar to
acute medical and surgical emergencies, then instituting treat-
ment without consulting the patient may be well justified. But
we have only shifted ground, for the question now becomes
whether or not "catatonia" or "homicidal threats" constitute oc-
currences that are significantly similar to acute injuries or
comatose conditions. Clearly, there are many differences be-
tween them, which we cannot consider here.15 But even on the
basis of the similarities, the alleged acute "illness" would justify
only the briefest therapeutic endeavors without the patient's con-
sent. For example, the patient brought to the hospital in a dia-
betic coma (involuntarily, since he was unconscious), is given
the necessary treatment for his disturbed physiological state. As
soon as he has regained consciousness, his consent for further
treatment must be obtained. Thus, even though his treatment
may be incomplete, he has the right to leave the hospital. Indeed,
15 Szasz, T. S., Scientific Method and Social Role in Medicine and Psy-
chiatry. 101 A. M. A. Archives of Internal Medicine 228 (February 1958);
Psychoanalysis and Medicine, In, Levitt, M. (Editor), Readings in Psycho-
analytic Psychology, Chapter 24, pp. 355-374. Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., New York, 1959.
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patients often avail themselves of this right-however self-in-
jurious (in a physiological sense) their acts might be. We then
speak of their "signing out (of the hospital) against medical
advice." It is clear, therefore, that only the briefest retention
(and psychiatric treatment) of so-called unmanageable patients
could be justified on this basis. But commitment is for an in-
definite period of time. It is anything but a brief, transitory
episode lasting only until the patient regains consciousness and
self-determination. On the contrary, his self-determination is, by
means of this act, taken away from him. Hence he cannot hope
to regain it in the course of a naturalistic sequence of events, such
as would be a recovery from a physiological imbalance. He can
regain it only by fulfilling certain normative behavioral criteria.16
What kind of alternatives to our present practices can we
contemplate? One possibility would be, perhaps, to involuntarily
"hospitalize" some persons who fall into the category of the "un-
manageable patient" and thus separate the "combatants" (i.e.,
patient and his socially significant objects). When this is done
humanely, it is quite common for the disturbed behavior to sub-
side. In the hospital, the patient may appear to be more or less
"normal," only to exhibit "psychotic" behavior again when his
relatives visit him or when he leaves the hospital. Clearly, then,
such a patient could be informed about who is whose agent.
This, however, would necessitate that the hospital psychiatrist
dissociate himself from his customary role of "helping the pa-
tient" or, more accurately, that he redefine what "helping the
patient" involves. I submit that helping the patient under such
circumstances requires, first, that the psychiatrist deal frankly
with his own split roles and loyalties. Thus, however paradoxical
it may seem, only after identifying himself as (partly) the rela-
tives' agent can the psychiatrist be of help to the patient! This
derives from the fact that to most people the word "doctor"
suggests that the person so designated will try to help them, ir-
respective of who they (the help-seekers) might be. Often, how-
ever, this is not true.17 For example, the physician already may
be committed to other patients, or his social role may specifically
prohibit him from treating certain patients (e.g., physicians who
are full-time, salaried employees of institutions).
16 Szasz, T. S., The Myth of Mental Illness, loc. cit.
17 Szasz, T. S., Recent Books on the Relation of Psychiatry to Criminology,
loc. cit.
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In view of this, the psychiatrist's failure clearly to identify
himself to the patient (including his social obligations to and
contract with others) leaves the latter helplessly impaled, so to
speak, on the semantic horns that the word "doctor" represents
for him. Only after clarifying the question of "Who is whose
agent?" can the patient proceed rationally in his attempts to
master his problem. This situation is wholly analogous to the
arresting detective's warning that he must issue to the accused,
namely, that anything the latter shall say might be used against
him. Is this not a genuinely "therapeutic" explanation of the
situation? Informing the involuntary mental patient that the
psychiatrist hired by someone other than himself is not (pri-
marily) his agent should be viewed in the light of this legal
model.
I wish to comment now on another possible objection to my
thesis, namely, that many psychiatric patients are "too disturbed"
to understand the explanation mentioned in the first paragraph
of the proposed Bill of Rights for the mentally ill. The belief
that psychotic patients are "too far gone," or "too crazy," or
"too sick" to understand what goes on about them, is of course,
time-honored. It is similar to the adults' belief that children do
not understand what goes on in the world of grown-ups, especially
insofar as sexual matters are concerned. This is one of those
cases in which a large falsehood or error is based on a small
kernel of truth. More often than not, children and "mentally
ill" persons are, if anything, hypersensitive to their human en-
vironment, especially in regard to communications (verbal as
well as of other kinds) that vitally affect them. The common-
sense argument that many mental patients could not be cor-
rectly informed as to the proceedings against them is belied,
lastly, by the fact that relatives, policemen, physicians, and others
commonly resort to fancifully embellished untruths in attempts
to cajole recalcitrant patients (and children) more willingly to
take steps of which they are afraid. The implication of this is
that any method (of persuasion) is justified, because the goal
to be achieved ("treatment") warrants it. There is a head-on
collision here between the medical value of "treatment" (or al-
leged treatment) on the one hand, and the ethical and legal value
of "due process" on the other. It is evident that in some cases
we cannot have both, and hence must choose one or the other.
Until now, in psychiatric matters, this dilemma has been re-
solved-perhaps somewhat unthinkingly-in favor of "treat-
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ment" and against the human dignities and protections inherent
in the "due process of law."
It is important to note that in similar dilemmas, occurring
in more purely judicial contexts, legal scholars have consistently
emphasized that in a democracy the value of the "due process"
should supersede most other values. Consider, for example, the
conflict between the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the
right of the accused to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, and, say, the needs of national security which may require
keeping secret the names and activities of undercover agents or
of confidential informers. Commenting on this dilemma, Pfeffer
stated: "The government must choose between prosecuting the
accused or keeping its secrets; it cannot constitutionally do
both." Is
As has often been observed, a democratic social organization
puts the government in the position of having to take chances
with respect to what its citizens might do. Such a government
cannot strive for the maximum safety or security that might be
attainable, but instead must sacrifice some of its safety in order
to maintain the values of liberty and dignity. As the procedural
safeguards of a democracy might make it difficult to apprehend
and convict some "criminals" (e.g., so-called professional gang-
sters), so it might-indeed, it inevitably must-make it similarly
difficult to hospitalize certain "mental patients" (e.g., those who
are reluctant to seek treatment voluntarily and have committed
no social offense).
The essence of my proposal is that we re-examine our psy-
chiatric practices, keeping in mind considerations of value.19 I
submit that the values inherent in the due process of law are
generally more important than those of psychiatric treatment, in-
voluntarily administered, or those of safeguarding the public
from the annoyance or danger of "mentally ill" persons. This, of
course, is a personal opinion concerning values which others need
not share. In advocating that whenever procedural safeguards
and psychiatric practices conflict, preferential valuation be ac-
corded to the former, I follow in the footsteps of those students
of law, men, and society who have taken a similar stand in re-
gard to conflicts of this type. This position, as I see it, is a sort
of social pragmatism or empiricism. According to it, it is the na-
ture of social procedures (e.g., laws and their administration,
18 Pfeffer, L., op. cit., p. 182.
19 Szasz, T. S., Moral Conflict and Psychiatry, Yale Review, in press.
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social contracts, etc.) -rather than avowed ethical aims-that
determine to what extent any given society may be considered
"open," and to what extent "closed." 20
Procedural safeguards imply, among other things, that the
law, if it be democratic, may not employ methods of crime-detec-
tion that would degrade the human dignity of those who use them.
It follows that as a democratic law must eschew "criminal"
methods of crime-detection and prosecution (irrespective of how
well "justified" these might allegedly be by the baseness of the
criminal deeds) -so a democratic or humanistic psychiatry must
likewise eschew misrepresentation or deceit of any kind (no
matter how well justified by alleged "therapeutic" considera-
tions). This means that both law and psychiatry-and, of course,
their individual practitioners or representatives-must play their
respective "games" with the utmost honesty. Cheating, no mat-
ter how well-intended, is not permissible.
One of the cardinal features of democratic laws is that they
be clear or unambiguous and well-publicized. The maxim,
"Ignorance of the law is no excuse," can be meaningful only in
a social context in which ex post facto laws are odious and il-
legal. Yet, the criteria on the basis of which "mental illness" is
diagnosed and involuntary hospitalization instituted, are at once
unclear and ex post facto. In other words, patients often do not
know that if they act in such and such ways, then they might
be committed. Informing them of this kind of social sequenti-
ality is one of the practices I have advocated. It is evident that
when one is charged with an unclearly defined offense, defense
is virtually impossible. 21 Hence, clarity in regard to social roles,
duties, expectations, etc.-defined not only in sentimental-mo-
tivational but rather in social science-factual terms-should be
the first task of psychiatry in its relation to the involuntary
mental patient. This alone, I believe, would go a long way toward
liquidating some of our so-called psychiatric problems. This
would come about by the transformation of some of these prob-
lems (now defined as psychiatric) into civil and criminal liti-
gations, and of others into interpersonal and social (group)
conflicts. Without such clarification, however, our psychiatric
practices may themselves be responsible, at least in some part,
20 Popper, K. R., op. cit.
21 In this connection, see Kafka, F., The Trial. A. A. Knopf, New York,
1948.
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for the very psychiatric disabilities that they allegedly set out
to cure.
Mental Illness as Performance Failure in the Family
Another issue concerning which objections might be antici-
pated pertains to the problem of the family-member who, on
account of his or her "mental illness," presents a serious threat
to the remaining members of the family unit. Consider, for in-
stance, the seriously depressed wife, the alcoholic-paranoid hus-
band, or the senile, regressed, and deteriorated grand-parent.
Each of these, in his own way, constitutes a threat to the life
and well-being of the rest of the family. Since people usually
interact most significantly with members of their families,
"mental illness"-in one sense-is principally a problem for those
"close" to the "patient." This, of course, is the reason why it
is mainly family members who "accuse" the "patient" of "mental
illness" and summon the aid of the psychiatrist. The objection
against this line of reasoning could be stated as follows: "Is it
not true that the depressed wife (or the threatening-abusive
husband) is 'sick' (or disabled) and that this causes grief for
her and for everyone around her? Something must be done and
forced hospitalization surely seems like the best and most hu-
mane course of action available to us, at this time." On the face
of it, this argument is so convincing that it might seem incon-
testable. Let me make clear, once more, that I am not implying
that people nowadays involuntarily hospitalized are not disabled
or ill-behaving in some senses. I am very much aware both of
their own patterns of behavior as well as of the misery that is in
the hearts of those around them. Let us not lose sight of human
rights and dignities, however, just because we are plunged into
situations of intense human suffering and distress.22
Without going into details, the crux of the matter, as I see
it, is that most of the situations that eventuate in a person's
involuntary mental hospitalization have one thing in common:
the "patient" has failed to perform certain necessary social
functions in the family. The emphasis is on the family as the
locus of the performance-failure. For should a person fail to
perform his job, the chances are that he will be fired; or, if he
fails to pay his taxes, he will be prosecuted. What, one might
ask, can family members do with respect to each other, when
22 Szasz, T. S., The Communication of Distress Between Child and Parent.
32 British Journal of Medical Psychology 161 (1958).
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one of them feels that another is falling down on his job? When
the family member who fails is a child, he can be disciplined or
punished. But what can be done when it is an adult member of
the family who fails? Three basic alternatives seem to be avail-
able. One is to request altered behavior, by asking, begging,
pleading, self-sacrificing, coercing, threatening, and so forth. The
other is to leave, that is, to sever relationship with the failing
partner. (This may be made conditional upon his or her refusal to
seek the sort of help that we, in our own conscience, consider
beneficial and necessary. Yet, how many people, who consent to
the commitment of others, would regard this as an acceptable
measure for themselves?) The third procedure is to enlist medi-
cal or psychiatric aid and secure the unwilling family-member's
enforced hospitalization. Involuntary psychiatric hospitalization,
and the whole complex machinery underlying it and making it
possible, thus fulfills some immensely important social and
psychological functions.23
To begin with, this measure provides an outlet for the
tensions generated by failures in family relationships. These
tensions are resolved, or ameliorated, moreover, in such a man-
ner that the moral (religious) integrity of the family is pre-
served intact. This is achieved by a de facto separation of family
members-and often by a total socio-psychological break-up (and
break-down) of the family-while at the same time maintaining
the legal intactness of the family unit. In other words, since
"mental illness" (of this kind) involves failures in adequately
fulfilling family obligations, considerations of its "treatment"-
and especially commitment-involve us in adjudicating what
is in part (or largely) a moral conflict. Ostensibly, then, the ques-
tion is one of "treatment" or "care," but covertly it is a ques-
tion of which value should have preference: the integrity of the
family unit or the autonomy of the individual? Commitment
23 There is a fourth method for solving this problem of the failing (and
hence unwanted) family member-namely, murder. This solution for cer-
tain problems in living is a favorite theme in novels and plays. Moreover,
it is a well known sociological observation that in our culture there are two
main types of homicide. In the one group falls murders committed by pro-
fessional criminals whose victims are either other (competing) criminals or
otherwise professionally chosen victims. In the second group fall the ama-
teurishly committed homicides consisting of the killing of one member of
a family by another (or some variation on this theme). It would seem that
for some people it is easier to kill someone to whom they had been closely
attached than it is to leave him. Likewise, for some people it might be easier
to commit their "loved ones" than to leave them, whereas others might
rank-order their values in an inverse order.
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(and commitment laws) tacitly favor the former. I submit that
we should explicitly favor the latter. An analogy may be drawn
here to the subject of marriage and divorce. Laws can be made,
as we know, that either prohibit divorce altogether, or else allow
it and make it more or less difficult or easy to obtain. The point
is that for those who consider the family an indissoluble unit, this
value takes precedence over other competing values. Yet, since
they too must have safety valves that will allow them to escape
from an intolerable marriage, they avail themselves of certain
alternatives, such as avoidance of marriage, annulment, and
separation without divorce. Involuntary hospitalization, I sub-
mit, must be viewed as another outlet from intolerable family
situations (involving not only spouses but all members living
together under one roof).
It is a corollary of the foregoing that while for the individual
involuntary hospitalization (of himself or of others) insures
maintenance of the family as a "good" (reliable) object, for
society as a whole it insures maintenance of family relationships,
"loyalties" and "responsibilities" as unchallenged positive values.
Thus, our whole social system has a stake in the safety valve
that commitment laws provide. Without it, re-examination, ex-
plicit re-assessment, and appropriate changes in our traditional
ideas concerning the roles (i.e., duties, obligations, rights, etc.)
of family members would be necessary. Yet, on the other hand,
numerous individuals and society as a whole have a stake also
in altering some of our present practices, and especially in in-
creasing the rights-as well as the obligations-of the so-called
mentally ill. This holds promise of reducing the burden of car-
ing for them. Finally, there are a variety of social forces in
contemporary western culture which in their own rights neces-
sitates steady and rather drastic revisions in our traditional
ideas concerning family relations. The familiar roles of father,
mother, and child are rapidly disappearing and giving way to
new, more functionally (even if more diffusely) defined roles.
A new role-definition of the "mentally ill" would, therefore,
seem to be in keeping with certain basic trends in contemporary
social life. According to this definition, a "mentally ill" person
would have more sense, so to speak, than he has been given
credit for in the past; hence, he would also have more rights as
well as more responsibilities than did his nineteenth *century
counterpart. All in all, such a person would be, in Harry Stack
Sullivan's felicitous words, "more human than otherwise."
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
9 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
Summary
It was suggested that a sharp distinction be made between
two types of "mental illness" and two corresponding types, of
psychiatric practice. In the one, the patient defines himself as
''mentally ill" in the hope of securing psychiatric assistance for
himself; the psychiatrist is his agent. In the other, the patient
considers himself to be more or less well, but behaves in such a
fashion that certain persons find him seriously annoying. With
the aid of a psychiatrist, he is defined as "mentally ill" and in-
voluntarily hospitalized. This psychiatrist is an agent, partly at
least, of whoever enlisted his aid (usually a relative of the
patient).
The differences between these two classes of "mental illness"
were briefly discussed. It was shown that the "mentally ill" of
the second type constitute a group of persons deprived of certain
of their civil liberties. A parallel was drawn between a person
accused of wrong-doing in a legal system, and another accused of
deviation in a psychiatric system. By means of this analogy, it
was shown that the former can avail himself of certain protections
denied to the latter, mainly because the psychiatric-accusatory
process itself is defined as being partly for the "patient's" benefit.
A proposed Bill of Rights for the (involuntarily defined and
hospitalized) "mentally ill" was presented. It was offered not
merely as a practical suggestion but also as a reminder of the
deficiencies of our present methods for dealing with this problem.
In conclusion, restraint and confinement by means of psychi-
atric interventions was described as an extra-legal system of
rules and penalties. Some connections between it and legal
channels proper were noted. The undignified and unconstitution-
al character of the social status of the involuntarily hospitalized
(committed) mental patient was emphasized.
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